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Special notice should be taken to the following:
1) Payments of either interest or installments must be made during
the life of the surviving spouse, and only to the surviving spouse. Here
special care should be taken in making certain that interest, or even
dividends, could not be received by anyone other than the surviving
spouse.
2) Payments must be made at least annually, and commence within
thirteen months of decedent's death. An annuity for the surviving
spouse that would commence two years from decedent's death would
fail to qualify if interest were not paid in the interim.
3) The power of appointment in the surviving spouse can be exer-
cisable only in favor of the surviving spouse or her estate.
4) Only the surviving spouse may exercise the power of appoint-
ment, and it must be exercisable in all events. If the policy provided
that the surviving spouse would lose the power of appointment, for
example, if she remarried, this condition would not be satisfied.23
It would pay the estate planner to compare payments made under
each settlement option employed, with the requirements set out in the
regulations, with particular attention toward all contingencies that might
occur under each option. In this way the planner would be assured
that the proceeds which he expects to qualify would, in the final analysis,
be subject to marital deduction.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR.
Torts-Distinction Between Intentional and Negligent Conduct Under
Tort Claims Act
Governmental immunity from civil suit is an historical characteristic
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The principle developed in England
on the premise that "the king can do no wrong."1  While it may be
said that immunity is still the basic rule and liability the exception, the
modern trend is to allow limited avenues of enforceable liability against
the government.2  In allowing itself to be sued for any wrongful act of
its employees and permitting liability "to the same extent as a private
individual,"3 the Federal Government, with a few exceptions, 4 has
"a The only exception to this rule is that an interest passing to surviving spouse
will not be considered terminable because of a common disaster clause provided 1)
the clause does not exceed six months, and 2) the termination of wife's interest by
a common disaster does not, in fact, occur. Sec. 21 Fed. Reg. 7894 (1956).
' See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 Law. Ed. 842 (1889).
Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1363 (1954).
828 U. S. C. § 2674 (1952).
4 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (1952).
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waived immunity. Adoption of Tort Claims Acts among the states has
been piecemeal and accompanied by a hesitancy of the courts to accede
to alterations of century old concepts. Thtis, almost without exception,
the courts have applied the doctrine of strict construction to these acts.
The result is that tort liability against most states is either unenforcable
or restricted to specifically defined categories of tort.'
The North Carolina Tort Claims Act6 goes as far toward removing
sovereign immunity as most state acts. Under the Act,7 a plaintiff is
permitted to sue the state if (1) the injury was the proximate result
of the negligence of a state employee or agency, (2) the active tortfeasor
was acting within the scope of his employment, and (3) the plaintiff was
free of contributory negligence." The Industrial Commission is author-
ized to hear and determine claims under the act and may award a maxi-
mum amount of $10,0009 with' the privilege of appeal by either party to
the courts. The court has committed itself to a strict construction of
the act.' 0 It has been held that there can be no recovery for a negligent
omission since the statute refers only to a negligent act," but that the
common law principles of negligence apply ;12 that a prisoner is not a
state employee within the meaning of the act,'3 and that a full release
given by plaintiff to the active tort feasor is also'a release to the state.
As a practical matter, the label given a tort is often not so critical as
to defeat or effect the right of recovery. 14 However, the requirement of
the Tort Claims Act that recovery may be had only for a negligent act
has recently focused attention on the often difficult distinction between
a negligent and an intentional tort.
The formula for ordinary negligence is simple, its application more
difficult. It is usually defined as the failure to use due care, or to act as a
reasonable and prudent man would act under the same or similar circum-
stances.' 5 Because the Tort Claims Act refers only to negligence, it is
'Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 et seq. (1952 and Supp. 1955).
7 See 29 N. C. L. REv. 416 (1951), for a history and analysis of the Act.
8 Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386
(1955).
°N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1955).
"Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 244
N. C. 461, 85 S. E. 2d 703 (1955); 33 N. C. L. REv. 613 (1955).
" Flynn v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 241 N. C.
617, 94 S. E. 2d 571 (1956).
" McFarlane v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 244 N. C. 385, 93
S. E. 2d 557 (1956).
"n Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386(1955).
" "Whether we say this is an action for damages resulting from a continuing
trespass or for the maintenance of a nuisance or accord it some other name is
immaterial." Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N. C. 17, 21, 92 S. E. 2d 429,
432 (1956).
"RPaossm, TORTS § 31 (1955).
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necessary to distinguish gross negligence in order to appraise the extent
of recovery against the state. The term gross negligence has appeared
in North Carolina decisions as indicating a degree of conduct more
reprehensible than ordinary negligence but falling short of an intentional
injury. It is attributed to the actor who is cognizant of the probable
consequences of his act but nevertheless acts in conscious disregard of
the likely consequences. 16 It is synonymous with wanton conduct.' 7
To this type of conduct, contributory negligence is no defense."' Since
contributory negligence is stated to be a defense to an action brought un-
der the Tort Claims Act, it would seem to follow that the legislature aid
not contemplate actions against the state for gross negligence. This
seems to be the view of the court as indicated by dicta in a recent case.'0
The same considerations deny recovery for the intentional injury. This
type of tort assumes actual knowledge by the actor of the impending
danger, coupled with a design and purpose to commit the injury.20
Compensation for such torts is not recoverable against the state.
In Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,21 a state high-
way patrolman shot and killed an arrestee. The findings of the Com-
mission revealed that the patrolman had arrested plaintiff's intestate,
placed him in the patrol car and proceeded to drive away. Upon being
seized around the neck by the deceased, the patrolman stopped the car
and pulled deceased out. In the ensuing struggle, the patrolman pulled
his pistol and after firing two warning shots into the ground in front
of deceased, fired a third shot which grazed decedent's chest, causing him
to fall. The fourth and fatal bullet struck deceased in the back. The
full Commission reversed a finding of negligence by the hearing Com-
missioner.2 2 On appeal to superior court, the Commission was reversed,
the court being of the opinion that the death of plaintiff's intestate was
the result of the negligence of a state employee acting within the scope
of his employment. 23 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision
'was reversed, the court holding that the Tort Claims Act covers only
negligent acts by state employees and that negligence cannot be predi-
cated on an intentional act.
"o Wagoner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 238 N. C. 162, 168, 77 S. E. 2d 701, 706
(1953).
" See, Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N. C. 23, 28, 92 S. E. 2d 393, 396 (1956).
8 Fry v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922).
"g "That contributory negligence is made a defense lends powerful support to the
view that the negligent acts contemplated are those to which contributory negli-
gence would be a defense." Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
244 N. C. 560, 564, 94 S. E. 2d 577, 581 (1956).
"0 Wagoner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 238 N. C. 162, 168, 77 S. E. 2d 701,
706 (1953).
-244 N. C. 560, 94 S. E. 2d 577 (1956).
" Record on appeal, P. 46, Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
244 N. C. 560, 94 S. E. 2d 577 (1956).
". Ibid., P. 59.
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Three months before the Jenkins case, the court decided Lowe v.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles.24 There, defendant's patrolman accidentally
shot and wounded plaintiff while attempting to arrest him for a speeding
violation. It appeared that the patrolman had pursued plaintiff for
several miles and after the cars had stopped, pulled his pistol and ran
toward plaintiff's car with the pistol pointed toward plaintiff. He tripped
in the darkness, causing the pistol to accidentally discharge and wound
plaintiff. The court affirmed a finding of negligence. The rationale of
the court's decisions seems to be: in intentionally and unjustifiably point-
ing a pistol at plaintiff, the patrolman violated G. S. 14-34,25 a statute
designed to protect human life. Therefore his conduct was negligence
per se.26
In both the Lowe and Jenkins cases, the patrolman exceeded his
authority in using his pistol. Although the facts are strikingly similar
and recovery was had in one and denied in the other, the cases are dis-
tinguishable. In the Jenkins case, although the patrolman undoubtedly
violated the assault statute in using his pistol, he intended to fire the
pistol and commit the injury. In the Lowe case, the patrolman's negli-
gence was based upon the intentional assault, but the injury itself was
not intended. It was rather the result of a negligent act.
The writer finds no quarrel with the court on the result reached in
either case. The difference was required by the Tort Claims Act. How-
ever, the decisions graphically demonstrate the limitations of the act,
limitations which might well be regarded as inadequacies. Thus it will
be observed that under the act, if any employee of the state is slightly
negligent and injures plaintiff, there may be recovery. But if the em-
ployee is grossly negligent or inflicts a wanton or intentional injury in
the course of his employment, the plaintiff must suffer the loss. The
Jenkins case is an express declaration of this point. It can be conceded
that immunity from civil suit is an inherent right of the sovereign state
and that any legislative concessions to allow the state to be sued for
any action is purely gratis. However it is a non sequitur to say that the
waiver should allow one plaintiff to recover and at the same time refuse
relief to the other because the tort against him arose from a more culpable
state of mind.2 7 The moral injustice is obvious. The medieval idea that
-1244 N. C. 353, 93 S. E. 2d 448 (1956).
" This statute provides that pointing a gun at any person constitutes assault.
"See, Case Survey, 35 N. C. L. Rv. 177, 249 (1957).
"' In the Jenkins case, the patrolman weighed 185 pounds and had received
training in self defense in the Marines. The deceased was intoxicated and weighed
only 135 pounds. The fatal shot entered his back as he fell to the ground. In
this regard, the court said: "Strong and appealing argument can be advanced why
compensation should be allowed in this case, upon the ground that the more grievous
the fault on the part of the agent of the State, the more readily the State should
compensate for the injury. But the court must construe the act as written." Jenkins
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the "king can do no wrong" has evolved in our enlightened age to mean
"the king can do little wrong."
Two factors are primarily responsible for the frustration of the trend
toward waiver of immunity: several states have constitutional provisions
against government liability.28 These provisions were undoubtedly
carry-overs from the highly theoretical English view that the king was
infallible. History relates and practical experience sustains the view
that the sovereign is fallible. The North Carolina constitution contains
no such restriction.2 9  Secondly, and perhaps more controlling, is a fear
by the various state legislatures and courts that the public treasury can
not afford to pay the sums demanded if tort liability were imposed.A0
This feeling was undoubtedly justified during the early growth of this
country when most state treasuries were financially instable. Today
however, the states do not have so serious a problem. Large budgets
and greater governmental spending conclusively show that government
is "big business." A policy against government liability is diametrically
opposed to the modern view that those most able to pay should pay for
the sufferer's loss; a view which prompted our Workman's compensa-
tion acts and similar legislation. The king's immunity is antiquated.
New York is more liberal than any state in allowing general liability
.in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions...
against individuals or corporations." 3' Of like effect is the Federal Tort
Claims Act.3 2 Had these statutes resulted in serious inroads upon the
public treasury, it would seem to follow that they would have been re-
pealed long ago. The fact that they remain on the books is convincing
evidence that they not only represent a growing social view toward
compensation for the innocent victim of tort, but also that they are
practical of operation.
It is not contended that the State should be liable for the torts of its
employees under all circumstances. It is obvious that such liability
should be restricted to acts within the principle of respondeat superior
and the New York and Federal acts, supra are so limited. In the
v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N. C. 560, 565, 94 S. E. 2d 577, 581(1956).
"8 Some of these states are West Virginia, Illinois, Arkansas and Alabama. Most
state constitutions provide that the legislature may waive liability. See Leflar and
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
" The only pertinent provision provides: "The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but its decisions shall be
merely recommendatory; no process in the nature of execution shall issue thereon;
they shall be reported to the next session of the General Assembly for its action."
N. C. CoNsT. ART. IV, § 9.
"0 See, Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Governnwnl,
47 COL. L. REv. 722 (1947).
"N. Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8 (1939).
228 U. S. C. 2671 et. seq. (1952).
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Jenkins case, the act was clothed in the dignity and authority of the
state and would seem to fall within the principle of respondeat superior.
If the State of North Carolina were liable "in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions against individuals,"3 3 the plaintiff in
the Jenkins case would have been compensated for an obvious wrong.
34
It is submitted that the North Carolina act should be amended to pro-
vide not only for the negligence of state employees, but also for in-
tentional wrongs committed by employees while acting within the scope
of the employment. There seems to be no logic nor valid reasons for re-
stricting sovereign liability to acts of simple negligence.
B. FRANK MAREADY.
Workmen's Compensation-Employees of Subcontractors-Rights
Against Owners and Principal Contractors
In Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co.' the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that an employee of an independent contractor, who operated
'the millinery department of defendant department store, could not main-
tain an action at law for negligence against the department store, but
that her remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive.
The Court held that the department store was an owner within the
South Carolina act,2 and the independent contractor operating the
millinery department was performing part of the "trade business or occu-
pation" of the department store so as to make the department store liable
to the employees of the millinery department for workmen's compensa-
tion.
The contract between the millinery company and the department
store gave the latter direct supervision over the operation of the depart-
ment, and stated that the name of the millinery company was not to be
used, but that it was to operate and advertise in the name of the depart-
ment store. The money from all sales was paid to the cashier of the
3 From the N. Y. Act; N. Y. CT. CL Acr § 8 (1939).
a" In view of the facts as found in the Jenkins case, the following excerpt from
a letter to the writer from the plaintiff's attorney is significant: ". . . the patrolman
who shot and killed D. C. Jenkins was tried ... upon a charge of manslaughter
.... [A]t the conclusion of the State's evidence, the court sustained the defendant's
motion for judgment as of nonsuit and directed a verdict of not guilty."
- S. C. -, 96 S. E. 2d 566 (1957).
S. C. CODE § 72-11 (1952). When any person, in this section . . .referred
to as owner, undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his
trade, business, or occupation, and contracts with any other person (. . . referred
to as subcontractor) for the execution or performance by or under such sub-
contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the
owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensa-
tion under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had
been immediately employed by him..
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